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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajnadatta goes


The

soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance and eternal can be proved after the manner of vayu. An objector is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of _samanyatod@r@s@ta_ inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But the Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But

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[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference are only pointed out as the basis.]

[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nada was probably not aware of Gautama's terminology.]

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then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences

as "I am Yajnadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction. When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajnadatta goes, there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajnadatta the body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else. As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure, pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].

In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered eternal (_nitya_). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal is ignorance (_avidya_) [Footnote ref 2]. Colour is visible in a thing which is great (_mahat_) and compounded. Air (_vayu_) is not perceived to have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not the actuality of colour (_rupasamskara_--i.e. in air there is only colour in its unmanifested form) in it. Colour is thus visible only when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions [Footnote ref 3]. In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also explained. Number, measure, separateness, contact, and disjoining, the quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)


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