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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

For we know that Nyaya and Vais'e@sika believe jati


style="text-align: justify;">[Footnote 1: _Tattvacintama@ni_ p. 812.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 809.]

[Footnote 3: _Siddhantamuktavali_ on _Bha@sapariccheda karika_, 58.]


kriya (action), nama (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref 1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyaya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyaya and Vais'e@sika believe jati, gu@na and kriya to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception

cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vacaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vacaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (_sa@mskara_) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is


[Footnote 1: _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 93-100, "_Panca caite kalpana bhavanti jatikalpana, gu@nakalpana, kriyakalpana, namakalpana dravyakalpana ceti, tas'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanat kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanat kalpana ucyante._" See Dharmakirtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]


present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vacaspati's answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see that early Nyaya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedanta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.

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