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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

Technically called viruddha hetu


should not be such that by

it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible (_asat-pratipak@sa_). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvabhasa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvabhasa is technically called _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetvabhasa of the second type, technically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of sadhya {_vipak@sa_), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called _anaikantika-hetu_, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now "being an object of knowledge" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sadhya), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sadhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the sadhya is not absolute (_anaikantika_). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically called _kalatyayapadi@s@ta_, may be found in the example--fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug,
etc. Here pratyak@sa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called _prakara@nasama_, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-eternal,

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[Footnote 1: It should be borne in mind that Nyaya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mima@msa did. Eternality of sound meant with Mima@msa the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.]

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since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like akas'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. _tadatmya_ (essential identity) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause and effect). Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity (_tadatmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyaya holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (_niyama_) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of which with the sadhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the sadhya, and not because of such specific relations as tadatmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark) with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama. The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].


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