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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

By Ratnakaras'anti in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts


perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion


[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_ on anumana.]


that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered the concomitance (_vyapti_) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the li@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its concomitance with fire (_t@rtiya-li@nga-paramars'a) is thus the cause (_anumitikara@na_ or _anumana_) of the inference (_anumiti_). The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vyapti._ When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called _bahirvyapti_; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called _antarvyapti._ The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyapti view of concomitance to bahirvyapti as a means of inference [Footnote ref 1].

justify;">Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (_hetu_) with the signate (_sadhya_), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vyaptigraha_) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance had been valid. The Mima@msa school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically called _anvayavyapti_ and the latter _vyatirekavyapti._ But even this is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomitance,


[Footnote 1: See _Antarvyaptisamarthana,_ by Ratnakaras'anti in the _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica_, 1910.]


or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke (_yasmin

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