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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

Sapak@sasattva and vipak@sasattva of a valid reason hetu


in defining inference as the "knowledge of that (e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of the reason" described a valid reason (_li@nga_) as that which is connected with the object of inference (_anumeya_) and which exists wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases


where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyaya qualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and _vipak@sasattva_ of a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapada further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what Kas'yapa (believed to be the family name of Ka@nada) said. Ka@nada says that we can infer a cause from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition or in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We can infer by a reason because it is duly associated (_prasiddhipurvakatva_) with the object of inference. What this association was according to Ka@nada can also be understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtful existence _sandigdha_). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious,

for there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The first fallacy is a combination of pak@sasattva and sapak@sasattva, for not only the present pak@sa (the ass) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipak@sasattva, for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Pras'astapada says that he is giving us the view of Ka@nada he is faithful to it. Pras'astapada says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire. But with regard to Ka@nada's enumeration of types of inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause," etc., Pras'astapada holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics of one member of a class to another member of the same class), and samanyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of flesh on its neck (_sasna_), I can whenever I see the same hanging


mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended to a different class of objects, it is called samanyato d@r@s@ta. Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis'citartha_) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called pararthanumana. We know that the distinction of svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana (inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists. Pras'astapada does not make a sharp distinction of two classes of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called pararthanumana. But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Pras'astapada, for in IX. 2, Ka@nada himself definitely alludes to this distinction (_asyeda@m karyyakara@nasambandhas'cavayavadbhavati_). The five premisses which are called in Nyaya _pratijna, hetu d@r@s@tanta, upanaya,_ and _nigamana_ are called in Vais'e@sika _pratijna, apades'a, nidars'ana, anusandhana_, and _pratyamnaya_. Ka@nada however does not mention the name of any of these premisses excepting the second "apades'a." Pratijna is of course the same as we have in Nyaya, and the term nidars'ana is very similar to Nyaya d@r@s@tanta, but the last two are entirely different. Nidars'ana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being [Footnote ref l]). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

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