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A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume 1

On the question of the fallacies of nidars'ana


style="text-align: justify;">{Footnote 1: Dr Vidyabhu@sa@na says that "An example before the time of Dignaga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asa@nga made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignaga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (_Indian Logic_, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vatsyayana had an imperfect example as "like a kitchen" (_s'abda@h utpatvidharmakatvadanuya@h sthalyadivat_, I.i. 36), but Pras'astapada has it in the proper form. Whether Pras'astapada borrowed it from Dig@nnaga or Dig@nnaga from Pras'astapada cannot be easily settled.]


(_nidars'anabhasa_). Pras'astapada's contribution thus seems to consist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of the nidars'ana, but the names of the last two premisses are so different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional Vais'e@sika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being pursued in Vais'e@sika circles independently of Nyaya.

There is no reason however to suppose that Pras'astapada borrowed anything from Di@nnaga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Pras'astapada's apparent innovations are all definitely alluded to by Ka@nada himself, and Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the question of the fallacies of nidars'ana, unless it is definitely proved that Di@nnaga preceded Pras'astapada, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former [Footnote ref 1].

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most important part of inference. Vatsyayana says that an inference can be made by the sight of the li@nga (reason or middle) through the memory of the connection between the middle and the major previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is _li@ngaparamars'a_, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection, but the present perception of the middle associated with the memory of the connection (_sm@rtyanug@rhito li@ngaparamars'o_). But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. Udyotakara's criticisms of Di@nnaga as shown by Vacaspati have no reference to this point The doctrine of _tadatmya_ and _tadutpatti_ was therefore in all probability a new contribution to Buddhist logic by Dharmakirtti. Dharmakirtti's contention was that the root principle of the connection between the middle and the major was that the former was either identical in essence with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

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