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A Hind Let Loose by Alexander Shields

And have authority more than others to concur

things, and hath made the least

of the flock to draw them out, Jer. xlix. 2. and l. 45. and did not think fit to begin with nobles, but began it, when powers and peers were in opposition to it; and when he blessed it so at length, as to engage the public representatives to own it, what was done by private persons before, they never condemned. 3. The people are injured without the nobles, therefore they may resist without them, if they be able: for there can be no argument adduced, to make it unlawful to do it with them. 4. It is true the nobles are obliged beyond others, and have authority more than others to concur; but separately they cannot act as representatives judicially: they have a magistratical power, but limited to their particular precincts where they have interest, and cannot extend it beyond these bounds; and so if they should concur, they are still in the capacity of subjects; for out of a parliamentary capacity they are not representatives. 5. All the power they can have is cumulative, not privative; for the worse condition of a ruler ought not to be by procuring. Why then shall the representatives, betraying their trust, wrong the cause of the people, whose trustees they are? Nay, if it were not lawful for people to defend their religion, lives, and liberties without the concurrence of parliaments, then their case should be worse with them than without them; for they have done it before they had them, and so they had better be without them still. 6. People may defend themselves against the tyranny
of a parliament, or primores, or nobles: therefore, they may do it without them; for if it be lawful to resist them, it is lawful to wave them, when they are in a conspiracy with the king against them.

5. We disallow all war without real undeclinable necessity, and great and grievous wrongs sustained: and do not maintain it is to be declared or undertaken upon supposed grounds, or pretended causes: and so the question is impertinently stated by our adversaries, 'Whether or not it be lawful for subjects, or a party of them, when they think themselves injured, or to be in a capacity, to resist or oppose the supreme power of a nation.' For the question is not, if when they think themselves injured they may resist? But when the injuries are real: neither is it every reality of injuries will justify their resistance, but when their dearest and nearest liberties are invaded, especially when such an invasion is made, as threatens ineluctable subversion of them. Next, we do not say, That a party's esteeming themselves in a capacity, or their being really in a capacity, doth make resistance a duty; except, all alike, they have a call as well as a capacity, which requires real necessity, and a right to the action, and the things contended for to be real and legal rights, really and illegally encroached upon: their capacity gives them only a conveniency to go about the duty, that is, previously lawful upon a moral ground. No man needs to say, Who shall be judge? the magistrate or people? For, 1. All who have eyes in their head may judge whether the sun shine or not; and all who have common sense may judge in this case. For when it comes to a necessity of resistance, it is to be supposed, that the grievances complained of, and sought to be redressed by arms, are not hid, but manifest; it cannot be so with any party only pretending their suffering wrong. 2. There is no need of the formality of a judge, in things evident to nature's eye, as grassant tyranny undermining and overturning religion and liberty must be. Nature, in the acts of necessitated ressistance, in such a case, is judge, party, accuser, witness, and all. Neither is it an act of judgment, for people to defend their own: defence is no act of jurisdiction, but a privilege of nature. Hence, these common sayings, all laws permit force to be repelled by force; and the law of nature allows self defence: the defence of life is necessary, and flows from the law of nature. 3. Be judge who will, the tyrant cannot be judge in the case: for, in these tyrannical acts, that force the people to that resistance, he cannot be acknowledged as king, and therefore no judge: for it is supposed, the judge is absent, when he is the party that does the wrong. And he that does the wrong, as such, is inferior to the innocent. 4. Let God be judge, and all the world, taking cognizance of the evidence of their respective manifestos of the state of their cause.

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