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The Life of Napoleon I (Volume 1 of 2) by Rose

And so take Arcola in the rear


[Footnote

54: Colonel Graham's despatches.]

[Footnote 55: "Corresp.," June 26th, 1796.]

[Footnote 56: Despatch of Francis to Wuermser, July 14th, 1796.]

[Footnote 57: Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief of Wuermser's staff, for the plan. Jomini gives the precise figures of the French on July 25th: Massena had 15,000 men on the upper Adige; Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at Salo; Serurier, 10,500 near Mantua; and with others at and near Peschiera the total fighting strength was 45,000. So "J.G.," p. 103.]

[Footnote 58: See Thiebault's amusing account ("Memoirs," vol. i., ch. xvi.) of Bonaparte's contempt for any officer who could not give him definite information, and of the devices by which his orderlies played on this foible. See too Bourrienne for Bonaparte's dislike of new faces.]

[Footnote 59: Marbot, "Memoires," ch. xvi. J.G., in his recent work, "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97," p. 115, also defends Augereau.]

[Footnote 60: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 321.]

[Footnote 61: "English Hist. Review," January, 1899]

[Footnote 62: Such is the judgment of Clausewitz ("Werke," vol. iv.), and it is partly endorsed by J.G. in his "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." St. Cyr, in his "Memoirs"

on the Rhenish campaigns, also blames Bonaparte for not having _earlier_ sent away his siege-train to a place of safety. Its loss made the resumed siege of Mantua little more than a blockade.]

[Footnote 63: Koch, "Memoires de Massena," vol. i., p. 199.]

[Footnote 64: "Corresp.," October 21st, 1796.]

[Footnote 65: "Corresp.," October 24th, 1796. The same policy was employed towards Genoa. This republic was to be lulled into security until it could easily be overthrown or absorbed.]

[Footnote 66: "Ordre du Jour," November 7th, 1796.]

[Footnote 67: Marmont, "Memoires," vol. i., p. 237. I have followed Marmont's narrative, as that of the chief actor in this strange scene. It is less dramatic than the usual account, as found in Thiers, and therefore is more probable. The incident illustrates the folly of a commander doing the work of a sergeant. Marmont points out that the best tactics would have been to send one division to cross the Adige at Albaredo, and so take Arcola in the rear. Thiers' criticism, that this would have involved too great a diffusion of the French line, is refuted by the fact that on the third day a move on that side induced the Austrians to evacuate Arcola.]

[Footnote 68: Koch, "Memoires de Massena," vol. i., p. 255, in his very complete account of the battle, gives the enemy's losses as upwards of 2,000 killed or wounded, and 4,000 prisoners with 11 cannon. Thiers gives 40,000 as Alvintzy's force before the battle--an impossible number. See _ante_.]

[Footnote 69: The Austrian official figures for the loss in the three days at Arcola give 2,046 killed and wounded, 4,090 prisoners, and 11 cannon. Napoleon put it down as 13,000 in all! See Schels in "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift" for 1829.]


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